Arbitration Under Maryland Law by Mullen, James Morfit
Maryland Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 4 Article 2
Arbitration Under Maryland Law
James Morfit Mullen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
James M. Mullen, Arbitration Under Maryland Law, 2 Md. L. Rev. 326 (1938)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/2
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ARBITRATION UNDER MARYLAND LAW
By JAMES MORFIT MULLEN*
Since time immemorial, governments have provided
means, either in the person of the Sovereign himself, or in
the form of courts, for the settlement of disputes between
subjects. No citation of authorities is necessary for the
statement, that neither before, nor after the dispute, none
of the parties can enforce arbitration without either some
controlling statute or an agreement requiring this method
of disposition of the controversy. Furthermore, it is a
settled principle of Maryland law, and one generally applied
in the United States, that, in the absence of an applicable
statute, no agreement in advance of a dispute to submit the
entire controversy to arbitration can oust the courts of their
jurisdiction, and either party to such a contract can ignore
it and proceed to enforce his rights through the courts.'
But, if the parties under such an agreement do submit to
arbitration, the award so made is binding and enforceable.2
Probably the origin of such stipulations is the provision
long used in charter parties that disputes thereunder must
be submitted to arbitration, if either of the parties so elect.
This provision has been held by the American courts not to
oust the courts of jurisdiction.3
There is, in Maryland, a limitation to the proposition
just stated in that while such an agreement to submit the
entire controversy to arbitration is invalid-" . . . it is
allowable to the parties to make such agreements in refer-
ence to preliminary and incidental matters of dispute, so
long as they retain the right to appeal to the Courts for the
determination of any substantive question of liability."'
* Of the Baltimore City bar. A. B., 1899, Johns Hopkins University;
LL. B., 1906, University of Maryland. Author of Jurisdiction Over Non-
Resident Motorists for Suits Arising from Local Accidents, (1937) 1 Md.
L. Rev. 222.
1Brantly, Contracts (2nd ed.) 227; Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bland 264
(1830); Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 H. & J. 408, 14 Am. Dec. 289
(1823); 5 C. J. 20.
2 Contee v. Dawson, Supra note 1.
3 58 C. J. 150; Poor, Charter Parties, Sec. 15.
1 Brantly, Contracts (2nd ed.) 227.
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This distinction is illustrated by an early decision of the
Court of Appeals.'
In that case there was an action on the common counts to
recover for a sum due on a mortgage. The mortgage pro-
vided, however, that the advances which the mortgage was
given to secure, should be determined and ascertained by
two named arbitrators. The point was made that as the
action was upon an arbitration and award, there was no
count in the declaration under which it was admissible, and
that there should have been a count on the award, or on an
account stated.
The Court held this point was not well-founded, and in
reaching its conclusion made a distinction between an arbi-
tration and the mere ascertainment of an incidental or col-
lateral matter. Judge Spence said:
"There is a distinction between a submission by
parties of matters in controversy, to the judgment of
two or more individuals, who are to decide the contro-
versy, and a reference of a collateral, incidental matter
of appraisement, or calculation, or the submission of a
particular question, forming only a link in the chain of
evidence, not calculated to put an end to controversy.'
"We hold that the reference in this case was a mere
matter of calculation and ascertainment, as to the
amount of money which had been advanced by Glenn to
Randall, which the mortgage was intended to secure;
that the reference and ascertainment did not merge the
original contract; and that as an admission of the de-
fendant, it was admissible in evidence, under the plead-
ings in this cause of the amount due the plaintiff.7"'
A more common illustration of the principle just stated
is the customary provision in fire policies, that, in case the
insured and the company shall disagree as to the amount
of loss or damage, either party may demand an arbitration
as to such amount. This end is accomplished by the ap-
pointment of an appraiser by each party, and if the ap-
praisers disagree, they shall submit their differences to an
umpire. A conclusion reached in this manner by two of the
three persons so named, determines the amount of loss or
8 Randall v. Glenn, 2 Gill 430 (1844).
6 Ibid, 2 Gill 430, 438.
' Ibid.
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damage. Such a provision is uniformly held valid and en-
forceable, and, unless waived, is a condition precedent to
resort to the courts.'
Construction contracts customarily contain a provision
that measurements of quantities, orders for extra work,
and the like shall be certified to by the architect or engineer
in charge. There has been considerable litigation on this
subject in Maryland. A discussion of these cases would
unnecessarily prolong this article. They are not within its
scope.' It should be said, however, that the architect or
engineer has no power or authority to give certificates in
defiance of the terms of the contract itself.10
It is also the law of Maryland that a provision in a con-
tract giving the architect or engineer these powers, does not
give him the right to construe the contract itself, and thus
to oust the courts of jurisdiction, unless the contract plainly
so requires.1
In some jurisdictions, on account of the congested condi-
tion of the civil courts, statutes have been passed providing,
in substance, that parties may stipulate in a written agree-
ment for the submission to arbitration of any future dispute
arising under the contract. Machinery is provided for the
method of arbitration, and for the enforcement of the award
by a court procedure, which does not necessitate re-trying
the issue submitted to arbitration. Such a statute has been
in force for many years in New York State, and, on account
126 C. J. 416; Brantly, Contracts (2nd ed.) 228; Connecticut Fire Ins.
Co. v. Cohen, 97 Md. 294. 55 Atl. 675, 99 Am. St. Rep. 445 (1903) ; Home
Ins. Co. v. Schiff's Sons, 103 Md. 648, 64 At. 63 (1906).
'The earlier decisions collected and classified in Brantly, Contracts (2nd
Ed.) 310.
10 City of Baltimore v. Ault, 126 Md. 402-426, 94 AtI. 1044 (1915) ; City of
Baltimore v. Talbot, 120 Md. 354, 366-7, 87 AtI. 974 (1913).
"I Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Waters, 110 Md. 673, 690-1, 73 Atl. 712 (1909)
"We will now consider whether, under a proper construction of the con-
tract, the Concrete Company was bound to construct the disputed ceiling.
We agree with the appellant that the provision in the contract that the
architect's decision as to the true construction and meaning of the drawings
and specifications shall be final, does not take from the Court and confer
upon the architect the power to construe the contract itself. The law is
clear that the common right of resort to the Courts for the determination
of the rights of parties or the settlement of disputes between them will not
be taken away by inference or implication or anything short of a distinct
agreement to waive it. No such agreement Is found in the contract before
us which in terms limits the architect's authority to determining the mean-
ing and construction of the drawings and specifications prepared by him,
but does not submit to his decision the contract rights of the parties."
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of the notorious delay in having the normal civil case liti-
gated in the New York courts, that statute has, in practice,
been frequently resorted to.12
Similarly, the United States Congress has passed a law
along the lines of the New York statute, making substan-
tially the same provisions for a stipulation in a contract
pertaining to interstate commerce and maritime transac-
tions under which either party may compel the arbitration
of any dispute under the contract.18
Arbitration, as a method of settling disputes without
recourse to the civil courts in those jurisdictions where the
work of the courts is not so congested, may not be the most
expeditious way of settling the controversy. In many cases
the final result is that the recalcitrant party, defeated in
the arbitration, may require enforcement of the award
through the courts. It may be suggested, therefore, that
in Maryland, where there are 'at present no delays in the
work of the courts, the best arbitration may be secured by
an original application to the courts.
It is also said that in New York State, and in cases
where the Federal statute on compulsory arbitration ap-
plies, satisfactory results have been obtained." Whatever
may be the merits of arbitration as opposed to resort orig-
inally to the courts for settlement of disputes between indi-
viduals, as the Maryland courts are usually abreast of their
dockets, there has been enacted in this State no general
legislation providing that a stipulation made in advance of
a dispute between individuals compels the submission of
the entire controversy to arbitration. There is, however, a
statute seeming to compel arbitration in the single instance
of tobacco classification by State Inspectors.
In considering this matter, to settle the terminology, we
shall follow the current practice of calling the agreement to
arbitrate, "the submission", and the result of the arbitra-
tors' proceedings and deliberations, "the award" '.
" New York Laws, 1920, Ch. 275; McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New
York, Ch. 72.
" 2 Fed. Code Ann. 445; U. S. C. A. Title 9.
" See, in general, Isaacs, Two Views o! Commercial Arbitration (1927).
40 Harv. L. Rev. 929; and Sturges, A Treatise on Commercial Arbitrations
and Awards.
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ARBITRATION UNDER AGREEMENTS MADE AFTER DISPUTES
ARISE AND BEFORE SUIT Is FILED
Though with the single exception of tobacco classifica-
tions, there is no statute in Maryland compelling arbitra-
tion before the disputes arise, it is the law of Maryland that
when, after a dispute arises, the parties do enter into an
agreement to submit the matter to arbitration, the agree-
ment will be enforced. The law gives every intendment
to this disposition of disputes between individuals; it con-
strues arbitration agreements liberally, and will enforce the
award after it is made, without reviewing the merits of the
controversy.15 It will be intended that all matters sub-
mitted have been decided by the arbitrator, unless the con-
trary appears, and it will also be intended that he has not
exceeded his authority. 16
There is no decision in Maryland determining whether
a submission need be in writing, but it is believed that the
general authorities without the State would control. These
hold that an agreement to submit a pending dispute
to arbitration need not be in writing unless the subject
matter of the suit (such as an agreement to convey land)
is one itself requiring a writing."7 As will be noted below,
a different rule applies to arbitration of cases pending in
court.
The arbitrators, of course, have no authority beyond
the terms of the submission. This is illustrated by a late
decision of the Court of Appeals. 18 Here it is held that an
arbitration agreement as to the interests of the parties in
certain companies or land, did not give the arbitrators the
right to pass upon the functions of one of the parties as a
real estate broker. In O'FerraZl v. DeLuxe Sign Co., 9 an
arbitrator to pass on accounts was held to have no authority
15 Dominion Marble Co. v. Morrow Bros., 130 Md. 255, 100 Atl. 292 (1917) ;
O'Ferrall v. DeLuxe Sign Co., 158 Md. 544, 149 Atl. 290 (1930); McDonald
v. Real Estate Board, 155 Md. 377. 142 AtI. 261 (1928) ; Roberts v. Con-
sumers Can Co., 102 Md. 362, 62 Atl. 585, 111 Am. St. Rep. 377 (1905) ;
Sisson v. Baltimore, 51 Md. 83 (1879) ; Md. and Del. R. R. Co. v. Porter,
19 Md. 458 (1863).
10 Caton v. McTavish, 10 G. & J. 192 (1838) ; Ebert v. Ebert, 5 Md. 353
(1854) ; Garitee v. Carter, 16 Md. 309 (1860).
17 3 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.). Sec. 1928; 5 C. J. 34, 35.
Pumphrey v. Pumphrey, 172 Md. 323, 191 Atl. 235 (1937).
' Supra note 15.
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to consider a letter raising a question of law. Unless the
submission submits questions of law to the arbitrators, they
usually have no right to pass upon such questions. The
award may be excepted to, on the ground that the arbitra-
tors determined a question of law, if upon the face of the
award, this fact appears." But an award cannot be im-
peached for an erroneous judgment upon the facts.2
When a bond is given to guarantee the performance of
the award, the terms of the bond cannot chaiqge the terms
of the submission.2 A second agreement of arbitration
supersedes a former incomplete one, and no rights can be
asserted under the first agreement. 3 When, from the
nature of a submission, the judgment of arbitrators may be
influenced or enlightened by the production of evidence, the
parties are entitled to notice of the time and place of the
proceedings of the arbitrators to investigate the matter,
otherwise the award is invalid and void.2 4
The arbitrators are not required to follow court rules
of practice, nor of evidence; but they cannot act unfairly.
In a Maryland case 25 in point there was a dispute as to the
sale of cans. Litigation in law and equity had been insti-
tuted by the parties. A written agreement was entered
into submitting to three arbitrators "the whole dispute be-
tween" the parties. The submission provided for the ma-
chinery of the submission and for an award in writing
signed by a majority of the arbitrators. A suit was filed
in equity to set aside the award. The question before the
court was the right of the arbitrators to reject certain depo-
sitions. The Court said:
"It has been settled by a long line of decisions that,
as arbitrations are intended to compose disputes in a
simple and inexpensive manner, whenever the parties
1O Ibid; State v. Williams, 9 Gill 172 (1850) ; Hewitt v. State, 6 H. & J.
95. 14 Am. Dec. 259 (1823) ; Witz v. Tregallas. 82 Md. 351, 33 Atl. 718
(1896).
-' Cromwell v. Owings, 6 H. & J. 10 (1823) ; Ebert v. Ebert. supra note 16.
Armstrong v. Robinson, 5 G. & J. 412 (1833).
26 Shafer v. Shafer, 6 Md. 518 (1854).
-' Bushey v. Culler. 26 Md. 534 (1867) ; Emery v. Owings, 7 Gill 488, 48
Am. Dec. 580 (1849): Bullitt v. Musgrave. 3 Gill 31 (1845) : Wilson v.
Boor. 40 Md. 483 (1874) ; Rigden v. Martin, 6 H. & J. 403 (1823).
26 Roberts v. Consumers Can Co., 102 Md. 362. 62 Atl. 585, 111 Am. St.
Rep. 377 (1905).
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to one have had a full and fair hearing the award of
the arbitrators, will be expounded favorably and every
reasonable intendment made in its, support.26 . . . In
such cases it is conceded that the Court will not look
into the merits of the matter and review the findings of
law or fact made by the arbitrators nor substitute its
opinion or judgment for theirs, but will require the
parties to submit to the judgment of the tribunal of
their own selection and abide by the award.
"The favor which the Courts accord to awards of
arbitrators is however, predicated upon the assumption
that in the conduct of the arbitration the parties to the
controversy had a full and fair hearing, and that the
award is the honest decision of the arbitrators and in-
volves no mistake so gross as to work manifest in-
justice or furnish evidence of misconduct on their
part." 27
It was held that the arbitrators are not governed by the
strict rules of evidence applying to courts of law. The
depositions were taken before a Notary Public and after
notice, and as the arbitrators in making their conclusions
refused to consider the depositions, the award was set aside
by the equity court.
The award need not show the right to notice and the
right to the appointment of an umpire upon the disagree-
ment of the referees. This may be proved by testimony
dehors the award."
When arbitrators upon differing are authorized to call
in an umpire, they may do so before or after the disagree-
ment.29  The submission and the award are the best evi-
dence of what was said by the parties before the arbitrator.
No evidence of what the parties said before the arbitrators
is admissible to defeat the award.0  If the submission re-
20 Ibid, 102 Md. 362, 368, citing: Lewis v. Burgess, 5 Gill 129 (1547);
Caton v. McTavish, supra note 16; Ebert v. Ebert, supra note 16; Garitee v.
Carter, supra note 16; Bullock v. Bergman, 46 Md. 270, 278 (1877) ; Witz
v. Tregallas, aupra note 20.
11 Supra note 25, 102 Md. 362, 368-9, citing: 3 Cyc. 743; Roloson v. Car-
son, 8 Md. 208, 221-2 (1855) ; Wilson v. Boor, s8tpra note 24; Burchell v.
Marsh, 17 How. 344, 15 L. Ed. 96 (1854).
28 Rigden v. Martin, supra note 24.
89 Ibid.
80 Willard v. Horsey, 22 Md. 89 (1864).
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quires the award to be sealed, its absence vitiates the
award.""
Agency questions may arise in connection with submis-
sions to arbitration, but are not properly within the scope
of this comment.82 An award may be oral unless required
by the terms of the submission to be in writing."3 An award
when it is made in accordance with the terms of the sub-
mission is binding. It is not subject to review and can be
attacked only for palpable error, corruption of arbitrators,
fraud or the like. 4
An award must determine all questions submitted, and
must be final. It must leave no matters for future deter-
mination except ministerial matters, such as an arithmetical
calculation. If the award does not answer these qualifica-
tions, it is invalid and may be set aside. 8
The award must not exceed the terms of the submission.
If the award does attempt to decide some matter not cov-
ered by the submission, and if the ultra vires part can be
separated from the rest of the award, the valid portion will
be sustained, otherwise the award is void in toto.8
Where after a hearing by arbitrators was had, the arbi-
trators received a statement from one of the parties con-
taining new and different items of claim from any presented
at the hearing and without the knowledge of the other party,
the award will be set aside, and equity will enjoin a suit at
law on the award. 7
Arbitrators, like jurors, have the privilege of consulta-
tion in private for the purpose of making their award. The
courts have a strong inclination to sustain awards, and a
mistake to set it aside must be gross and manifest. Errors
of judgment are not enough to set aside the award."
:I Price v. Thomas, 4 Md. 514 (1853).
2 Bullitt v. Musgrave, supra note 24; Sisson v. Baltimore, 8upra note 15.
11 O'Ferrall v. DeLuxe Sign Co., supra note 15.
8, This is discussed generally in 5 C. J. 179-190. See also Witz v. Tre-
gallas, supra note 20.
35 Archer v. Williamson, 2 H. & G. 62 (1827) ; Carter v. Calvert, 4 Md.
Ch. 199 (1851) ; Griffith v. Jarrett, 7 H. & J. 70 (1826) ; Witz v. Tregallas,
supra note 20.
16 Ebert v. Ebert, supra note 16; Armstrong v. Robinson, supra note 22;
Garitee v. Carter, 8upra note 26; Caton v. McTavish, supra note 16; Crom-
well v. Owings, supra note 21; Bullitt v. Musgrave, supra note 24.
87 Sisk et al. v. Garey, 27 Md. 401 (1867).
88 Roloson v. Carson, supra note 27.
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It is held in Maryland that unless the terms of the sub-
mission provides differently, all of the arbitrators must
join in the award. Usually, however, as will be seen from
the Maryland authorities, when two arbitrators and an um-
pire are appointed to adjudicate the dispute, a majority
may sign and the award is valid and binding.3 9
An award when made may be sued upon at law. The
Code of Public General Laws provides a form of declaration
for suits of this kind.0 When a cause of action that has
been submitted to arbitration is sued upon, the arbitration
and the award as a defense must be specially pleaded. 1
When it is desired to set aside an award because it is de-
fective, or because of improper practices of the arbitrators,
or in the procuring of the award, proceedings to set it aside
must be brought in equity.
2
MARYLAND STATUTES AS TO ARBITRATION
These are several Maryland statutes as to arbitration.
Only one of them requires the submission of a future dis-
pute to arbitration without the consent of both parties.
These statutes deal with: 1. Arbitration of pending cases;"
2. Arbitration of claims in connection with decedents' es-
tates ;44 3. Arbitration of labor disputes; 4. Arbitration of
tobacco classification disputes.
1. Arbitration of pending suits under the Maryland
Statute.
Sections 50 to 55, of Article 75, of the Code of Public
General Laws provide for arbitration of "any cause insti-
tuted in any of the courts of this State" by rule of court
and by consent of the parties, and for entry of judgment on
the award.
The history of this law, which was originally enacted in
1778,"' and of the previous methods of arbitrating suits in
" WItz v. Tregallas, supra note 20; Harryman v. Harryman, 43 Md. 140
(1875).
Md. Code, Art. 75, See. 28 (23).
,' Kerr v. Co-operative Improvement Company, 129 Md. 469, 99 At. 708
(1816).
12B. & 0. R. R. v. Canton Co., 70 Md. 405, 417-8, 17 At. 394 (1889).
41 Md. Code, Art. 75, Secs. 50-58.
"Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 266.
41 Md. Acts 1778, Ch. 21.
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court, is fully set out in the case of Shriver v. State.46 In
that case, after the award had been made in a pending suit
under the statute, the party winning the award applied for
a judgment thereon in the Frederick County court. This,
the court held, the plaintiff was entitled to have. Judge
Chambers, stated47 that, prior to the Act of 1778, submis-
sions to an award of a pending action by rule of court were
familiar to the law since its earliest history, and were usu-
ally enforced by attachment for contempt. This procedure
was effectuated by an English statute, 8 which the court, in
the case just referred to, held was in effect in Maryland;
but the Maryland Act of 1778, changed the method of en-
forcing the award from attachment by contempt to furnish-
ing as a method of enforcing the award such appropriate
remedy as the terms of the award might require.
The court held that the Act of 1778 as a remedial law
was designed to facilitate the administration of justice and
was entitled to a liberal interpretation. In this connection
Judge Chambers said :
"In the case before us, the cause had been instituted
in the usual way by a writ, the arbitrators named, and
the extent of their authority defined. The question
then as to what were proper subjects of reference, is to
be determined by the principles of common law, and not
by the Statute of William, or the Act of 1778. We
think the cases referred to in the argument abundantly
prove, that all matters of litigation, whether of law or
of equity jurisdiction, whether claims for specific
articles of property, real, personal or mixed, or sums
of money; whether such claims be by the party, who, in
the suit pending, or in the case to be made a rule of
Court by written agreement, may be plaintiff or defend-
ant, can be the subjects of reference, and when the
award is made and returned to Court, pursuant to the
Act of 1778, a judgment thereon is by that Act re-
quired.
"If the award be returned in a common law Court,
and directs that to be done, which by the ordinary terms
4"9 G. & J. (1837).
7 Ibid, 9 G. & J. 1, 11.
'1 9 and 10 William III, C. 15.
19 Supra note 46, 9 G. & J. 1. 13.
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of judgment of common law Courts may be directed,
and to enforce which, therefore, the known executory
writs will be the appropriate process, such writs will be
issued to execute the judgment.
"Thus if the award directs payment of money, the
delivering over of the possession of lands, or the
restoration of a chattel, the writs of fieri facias, habere
facias possessionem, or retorno habendo, might be an
adequate and proper means of enforcing the judgment
on that award, and the judgment must be in favor of
the party entitled, whether plaintiff or defendant. If
the award should direct a matter, for the enforcement
of which the usual writs of execution will not avail,
such as the execution of an instrument of writing, then,
from the necessity of the case, the attachment must be
resorted to, as before the Act of 1778."
In connection with this statute, it should be observed
that in Baltimore City the rules of court provide for sub-
mission of pending suits to arbitration. The common law
cases are governed by Rule 34 of the Supreme Bench of
Baltimore City.
While Article 75, section 50, does not in terms specify
that the submission of a pending case shall be in writing;
yet, as the rules of court for Baltimore City"° require all
agreements in relation to proceedings in the case to be in
writing, the effect is, that the submission of the pending
case in the law courts of Baltimore City must be in writing.
There have been a number of decisions in the Court of
Appeals as to procedure and other matters of arbitration
under this statute. It is important, however, to observe the
terms of Section '51 as follows:
"Such award shall remain four days in court during
its sitting after the return thereof before any judgment
shall be entered thereon, and if it shall appear to the
court within that time that the same was obtained by
fraud or malpractice in, or by surprise, imposition or
deception of the arbitrators, or without due notice to
the parties or their attorneys, the court may set aside
such award and refuse to give judgment thereon."
50 Rule 28 for Common Law Courts.
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The remaining sections of this portion of Article 75"1
make miscellaneous provisions for such things as continuing
the case until the award is made; for the appointment of
new arbitrators upon the death or refusal to act; placing a
time limit of eight months upon consideration by the arbi-
trators, and for service of the award upon the losing party.
While these sections are contained in the Pleading and
Practice section of the Code pertaining only to law cases,
yet Section 50 provides for arbitration "of any cause insti-
tuted in any of the courts of this State".
The first sections of the statute may be said to indicate
no intention to include equity cases within the operation of
the statute, however broad the language. Moreover, there
has been a decision by Chancellor Bland to the effect that
the statute pertains only to law cases. "2
The Chancellor pointed out in the course of his opinion,
however, that while there had been no statutory regulation
of references of equity suits to arbitration, yet it has been
held by the equity courts to be within the regular scope of
their powers to pass an order, with the consent of the
parties, referring any suit then pending to arbitration and
to enforce the award.
The only effect, therefore, of not having the statute in-
clude equity cases would be that some of the details for the
regulation of the methods of arbitration would not apply to
equity cases. The statute does not apply to questions aris-
ing after a judgment has been entered. 3 And there is a
difference between the reference of a law case for an ac-
counting and for an arbitration under Article 75, section
50.54
It has been held in connection with Article 75, section 50,
(differing from the Orphans' Court arbitration statute)
that the court has no power to appoint new arbitrators, nor
to re-submit the matter to the same arbitrators after setting
aside an award.5
11 Secs. 52-55.5 2 Phillips v. Shipley, 1 Bland 516 (1828). But see Caton v. McTavish,
supra note 16; and Shriver v. State, supra note 46.
5 State v. Jones, 2 Gill 49 (1844).
' Wisner v. Wilhelm, 48 Md. 1 (1877).
5 Harryman v. Harryman, supra note 39; Calvert v. Carter, 18 Md. 73
(1861).
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When a cause has been submitted under Article 75, sec-
tion 50, the arbitrators may consider all matters within the
submission, whether actually averred in the pleadings, or
which by appropriate amendment could be included in the
pleadings. 6
ARBITRATION OF CLAIMS IN ORPHANS' COURT
The essential features of this procedure are set out in
Article 93, section 266, as follows:
"The several Orphans' Courts of this State shall
have power, with the consent of both parties, to be
entered on their proceedings, to arbitrate between a
claimant and an executor or administrator, or between
an executor and a person against whom he has a claim,
or the dispute may by the parties be referred to any
person or persons approved by the Orphans' Court."
It is to be noted that the arbitration must be "with the
consent of both parties". It may be by the judges them-
selves, or by some other person to be approved by the
judges.
The statute applies only to claims involving decedents'
estates, and not to those contracted by an executor or ad-
ministrator in his individual capacity."' The statute has no
application when the judges act as individuals on matters
not within the scope of the act.5" An award made under
the statute must be ratified by the Court unless this defect
is cured by acts of the parties.59
If the arbitrators take action beyond the proper scope
of their functions, such as the allowance of usurious interest
on the claim, the award may be excepted to in the Orphans'
Court. An appeal may be taken and the error rectified in
the Court of Appeals. The Orphans' Court has authority
under the statute" to remand the case to the arbitrator
to pass on other elements of the claim. 1
5' Ing v. State, 8 Md. 287 (1855).
Browne v. Preston, 38 Md. 373 (1873).
"Strite v. Reiff, 55 Md. 92, 94 (1880); State v. McCarty, 64 Md. 253.
1 AtI. 116 (1885).
11 Dement v. Stonestreet, I Md. 116 (1851).
00 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 267.
61 Woods v. Matchett, 47 Md. 390 (1877).
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ARBITRATION OF LABoi DISPUTES
The Maryland statutory law contains a plethora of pro-
visions with regard to settlement of labor disputes. These
are found in two different parts of the Code.2 As is the
case in most other provisions of the Maryland statutory
law with regard to arbitration, none of these provisions is
effective without the consent of the parties. One of them
has, however, a provision for publicity to act in terrorem
against the party in default.
1. Corporate Employers. While Article 7 is headed
"Arbitration and Award", it pertains only to disputes be-
tween corporations and their employees. The first section
provides that whenever controversy shall arise between a
Maryland corporation in which the State is interested, and
a person in its employ, which, in the opinion of the Board of
Public Works, shall tend to impair the usefulness or pros-
perity of the corporation, the Board of Public Works is
given the power to get a statement of the grounds of the
controversy, and in their judgment they may propose set-
tlement by arbitration. If the parties to the controversy
agree, the Board of Public Works may provide in due form
for the arbitration of the controversy, but if either party
refuses to submit to arbitration, it is the duty of the Board
of Public Works to investigate the controversy and make
a report to the next General Assembly.
The remaining sections of Article 7 (sections 2 to 7 in-
clusive) pertain to disputes between corporations and any
person in their employment or service. No Maryland cases
have been located in which these other sections of Article 7
have been construed, but it seems to be plain that while the
first section pertains only to corporations in which the State
is interested, the remaining sections of the article provide
generally for arbitration of disputes between corporations
and their employees.
These sections (2 to 7) provide in detail for arbitrating
such disputes as are covered by them, but, as in other cases,
it is essential to the operation of the statute that the contest-
ing parties shall agree. It seems unnecessary to go into all
" Md. Code, Art. 7 (in full) ; and Md. Code, Art. 89, Sees. 4-12.
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of the details of these sections further than to say that the
arbitration may be made by a judge or justice of the peace
to whom the offended party may complain, and such judge
,or justice of the peace, if the parties agree, may either act
,olely, or propose arbitrators, not less than two nor more
than four, who together with the judge or justice of the
peace shall have power to hear and determine the dispute.
When the dispute is determined, the judge may award
execution as upon verdict, confession or non-suit. Costs
,nay be taxed and shall be paid equally by the parties. The
award remains in court for four days before judgment is
entered thereon and may be set aside if "obtained by fraud,
or malpractice in or by surprise, imposition or deception of
the arbitrators, or without due notice to the parties or their
attorneys." It is to be observed that the grounds for ex-
cepting to the award are in exactly the same phraseology
as those provided in Article 75, Section 51, for the arbitra-
tion of cases pending in court.
2. Strikes or Lockouts. The second type of labor arbi-
tration is provided by Article 89, sections 4 to 12 inclusive,
containing provisions for the arbitration between employers
of labor, whether a person, firm or corporation, and their
employees, involving ten or more persons, which contro-
versy may result in a strike or lockout. This act was orig-
inally passed in 1904.3 While, as in all other cases, in
order for the arbitration to be effective, it must be assented
to by both parties, the Chief of the Bureau of Industrial
Statistics is given the right to investigate the dispute, and
witnesses can be summoned before the President of the
Board. If the parties agree to arbitration, machinery is
provided therefor, but if the parties will not agree to arbi-
tration, then the Chief of the Bureau of Industrial Statis-
tics, or the person deputized by him, is directed to proceed
to investigate the controversy with authority to summons
both parties before him, and having ascertained which party
is, in his judgment, in fault, he shall publish a report over
his official signature in some daily newspaper, assigning
the responsibility or blame for the controversy.
"' Ch. 671; Md. Code, Art. 89, Secs. 4-12.
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AnBITRATION OF TOBACCO CLASSIFICATIONS
Sections 22, 23 and 50 of Article 48, with amendments, 4
provide for the arbitration or claims in connection with the
sampling of tobacco. There are apparently no decisions of
the Court of Appeals. The arbitration provided for seems
to be compulsory.
" Md. Code Supp., Art. 48, Sees. 22-23.
